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Trademark

SCOTUS: Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group., Inc.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that claim preclusion, i.e., the doctrine of res judiciata, did not apply to a defense that Lucky Brand failed to fully adjudicate in a prior lawsuit, but is now raising in its current lawsuit against Marcel Fashions as the current lawsuit raised “different conduct” and “different claims.”

Specifically, Lucky Brand and Marcel Fashions have been stuck in trademark related litigation for almost 20 years as both brands use the word “Lucky” as part of their marks on jean and apparel. In 2003, Marcel sued Lucky Brand for using the phrase “Get Lucky” on its apparel as Marcel owned a trademark on that phrase. A settlement agreement was reached in which Lucky Brand agreed to stop using the phrase and Marcel agreed to release any claims regarding Lucky Brand’s use of its own trademarks.

In 2005, a Lucky Brand sued Marcel for infringing on its trademark and Marcel counter sued alleging that Lucky Brand continued to use the phrase “Get Lucky.” In both a motion to dismiss the counterclaims and an answer to them, Lucky Brand argued that the counterclaims were barred by the settlement agreement, but it did not invoke that defense later in the proceedings. The court in the 2005 Action permanently enjoined Lucky Brand from copying or imitating Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark, and a jury found against Lucky Brand on Marcel’s remaining counterclaims.

Then in 2011, Marcel sued Lucky Brand for continuing to use the “Get Lucky” mark, i.e., violating the injunction, in Lucky Brand’s other marks containing the word “Lucky.” Lucky Brand counterclaimed and moved on a motion to dismiss based on the 2003 settlement, which the district court granted. The Second Circuit, however, held that Lucky was precluded from raising the release defense by the doctrine of “defense preclusion.” The court reasoned that Lucky should have raised that defense at some point in the years of litigation since the settlement. Given that Lucky had not inserted that defense prior, it was now barred from doing so by the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal to the SCOTUS, Lucky argued the ruling was "absurd," as it would force litigants to raise any and all conceivable potential defenses to avoid forgoing them later.

The SCOTUS, unanimously, overturned the Second Circuit’s ruling and held that “claim preclusion” did not preclude Lucky’s release defense because the two suits were not based on the “same claim.” The 2005 litigation arose out of allegations that Lucky infringed Marcel’s “Get Lucky” trademark. The 2011 litigation, on the other hand, arose out of allegations that Lucky committed infringement by using its own marks containing the word “Lucky.”

Although the Court did not specifically determine under what circumstances claim preclusion could apply to defenses specifically, the Court recognized that considerations “other than actual merits” may affect whether a litigant decides to assert a defense. In this case, however, given that the defense was inserted in a case with “different conduct” and “different claims,” claim preclusion did not apply to this case.

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Copyright

Copyright Damages Limited to Three Years in the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit has ruled that copyright infringement damages are limited to those damages incurred within three years prior to the commencement of a lawsuit.

Specifically, in the case In Sohm v. Scholastic Inc., No. 18-2110, 2020 WL 2375056 (2d. Cir. May 12, 2020), Joseph Sohm sued Scholastic Inc. for, among other things, infringing upon 89 of his photographs as the company did not obtain a license to use the photos appropriately. The district court granted in part and denied in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgement. On appeal, both Sohm and Scholastic raised multiple challenges to the district court order. In relevant part, Scholastic argued that the district court erred in allowing damages to accrue more than three years prior to the date that the copyright infringement suit was filed.

The Second Circuit reversed the district court findings and agreed with Scholastic that damages should be limited to three years prior to the date the suit was filed. Specifically, the Second Circuit cited Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S.663 (2014), which held that the Copyright Act limited a plaintiff’s recovery to damages incurred within three years prior to filing suit. There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[u]nder the Act’s three-year provision, an infringement is actionable within three years, and only three years, of its occurrence” and “the infringer is insulated from liability for earlier infringements of the same work.” Thus, “a successful plaintiff can gain retrospective relief only three years back from the time of suit” and that “[n]o recovery may be had for infringement in earlier years.”

Although this decision may favor defendants in copyright actions, not all circuits have interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling the same way. Some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have since suggested that damages incurred more than three years prior to suit should be permitted so long as the plaintiff had no reason to know about the infringement prior to the three-year limitations period. See, e.g., Johnson v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184455 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019).

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Patents

European Patent Office rules that Plants and Animals are not Patentable

In a 70 page opinion, the European Patent Office’s (EPO) Enlarged Board of Appeals has ruled that plants and animal that are produced only by “essentially biological processes” are not patentable as per the European Patent Convention (EPC).

In 2015, the EPO originally held that plants and animal products that are exclusively obtained by essentially biological processes were allowed to be patented under the EPC. The EPO's administrative council, however, later introduced a rule that barred such products from being patented, and that rule took effect in July 2017. This ruling does not apply to patents granted prior to July 2017 or patent applications that were filed prior to that date.


As reported by Law360, the EPO’s president has stated “We hope the new verdict will help to put an end to a decade of complete legal absurdity and chaotic decision-making at the EPO. However, there is still a huge risk that big corporations, such as Bayer (previously Monsanto) will try to abuse patent law to take control of our daily food."

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Trademark

SCOTUS' First Teleconference: USPTO vs. Booking.com

For the first time ever in history, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) heard oral arguments via teleconference to abide by the COVID-19 shelter-in-place orders. The first case the justices heard in this new format was U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com, No. 19-46, a trademark case that presented the question of “whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.”

Under current trademark law, generic terms (i.e., common words used to describe goods or services, such as “car” or “hotel”) cannot be registered as trademarks. Descriptive terms (i.e., words that describe features or qualities of a good or service, such as “ultra-fast” or “fresh”), however, may qualify for trademark protection once it is shown that the mark has acquired a secondary meaning, i.e. consumers have come to associate the mark with a specific source/origin of the good or service.

Specifically, the dispute in this case was over whether using the generic term “booking” in conjunction with the general domain “.com” allowed for the term “BOOKING.COM” to be afforded trademark protection for the company Booking.com, i.e., a travel company that allows users to make various travel reservations via its platform. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) held that the terms, even when used together, were generic and therefore not applicable for trademark protection. The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sided with the company as it found that customers have come to associate the website with the company’s brand. The Supreme Court agreed to review the decision on appeal.

Erica Ross, representing the USPTO, relied on the 1888 Supreme Court decision, Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888), which held that the combination of a generic term with a corporate designation such as “Company” did not create a protectable trademark. She drew the comparison that the general domain “.com” was similar to corporate designations and thus fell under the long-standing principle that generic terms cannot be protected as trademarks.

Lisa Blatt, arguing on behalf of Booking.com argued that when congress passed the Lanham Act, it repudiated the 1888 case in favor of a rule that asks what consumers believe that a term signifies. Specifically, the statute tells the USPTO and the courts to determine whether a term is generic by examining the “primary significance” of that term to consumers.

During the teleconference, the justices spoke in order of seniority. Justice Clarence Thomas, who seldom ever asks questions, ask two questions during the teleconference. Thomas first asked Ross to explain why, if businesses could register trademarks that incorporate generic terms into 1-800 telephone numbers, the same rule shouldn’t apply to internet domain names. Ross stated that the given the federal circuit had ruled that 1-800 telephone numbers may incorporate generic names and given that, the USPTO was obliged to follow that ruling. Justice Thomas then asked Blatt if there was any other rule other than the “primary significance test” that spoke to why her client should prevailed. Blatt replied by pointing to other sections of the Lanham Act that overruled any other per se rule that would ignore consumer’s expectation when deciding whether or not a mark deserves trademark protection.

Ultimately, it appeared that justices’ questions suggested that a majority of them would like to find a middle ground that draws a coherent line between generic and merely descriptive terms and makes good policy sense.

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Patent

Apple wins against Zomm Over Emergency SOS Patent

In a legal battle between Apple and Zomm LLC, Apple has recently come out on top when the PTAB ruled that Zomm LLC’s U.S. Patent No. 8,351,895 (‘895 patent), which allows wireless devices to connect to mobile phones and initiate an emergency services call, was obvious and therefore invalid.

Specifically, Zomm LLC’s ‘895 patent consisted of a wireless device that had the ability to initiate a local emergency call using a pre-recorded message either via stored data on the device to detect which local authorities to call or via connection to external hard drives or devices.

Zomm LLC had initiated a lawsuit against Apple for multiple causes of action, including one for violating the ‘895 patent patent when Apple used similar technology in its Apple Watch, which has the ability to initiate an emergency call if the watch detects an emergency. The PTAB board held, however, that prior art or prior patents and technology deemed this patent obvious and denied Zoom’s request to amend the invalidated claims. Although the PTAB found that Zomm met the statutory requirements for amendment, it stated that Apple was able to show the proposed substitute claims would have been obvious to a skilled artisan.

Although this patent has been deemed invalid, Zomm has filed another amended compliant in district court where the case currently resides with Judge Haywood S. Gilliam Jr.


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Clorox & Lysol: How Clean are They When it Comes to Patents?

On Friday, Perimeter Brand Packaging LLC (Perimeter) sued the maker of Lysol Disinfecting Wipes, Reckitt Benckiser LLC (RB), for stealing its patented packaging technology that keeps its wipe moist.

Perimeter holds U.S. Patent Nos. 7,703,621 and 8,297,461, that are design patents for a canister that is able to retain liquid and keep wipes moist. Perimeter had licensed this patent previously to Clorox Co. until 2015 when Clorox started to utilize its own design that did not infringe upon Perimeter’s.

In Perimeter’s compliant, it uses Clorox’s 2015 disinfecting wipes container to demonstrate the similarities between its design patents and Lysol’s. Additionally, Perimeter hired a research firm in 2018 that confirmed that Lysol’s design had infringed upon its patents. Subsequently, Perimeter had sent several letters to RB requesting it license its patents, which RB refused.

Given COVID-19 pandemic, Lysol has seen the sales of sanitizing wipes more than double in the past two months as per market research firm Nielsen Corp. Perimeter's suit seeks damages in compensation for RB's alleged patent infringement, as well as treble damages and an injunction preventing continued infringement.

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Copyright

Michael Jordan’s Tequila Company, Cincoro, Sued for Copyright Infringement

Anais' Photos vs. Photos Used by Cincoro

Anais Ganouna, a commercial photographer, filed a lawsuit against Cincoro Spirts Group (Cincoro), a tequila company partly owned by Michael Jordan, for infringing on her copyright by allegedly using several of her photos on Cincoro’s website without a license.

Specifically, the compliant states that Anais and her company (Frank & Anaïs, LLC) were commissioned through an ad agency, The Colors You Like LLC (TCYL), to conduct a photo shoot of Cincoro’ agave fields and tequila production process for use in Cincoro’s website and online marketing. Before commencing the shoot, TCYL agreed to pay Anais a discounted daily rate for her time and labor. No specific licensing/usage of Anais photographs were discussed, which Anais believed were to be negotiated later.

Upon completing the photo shoot, Anais attempted to negotiate a licensing fee (approximately $114,433 for 15 photos), which TCYL and Cincoro refused to pay. As per an array of text messages and emails, TYCL stated that it was not interested in using Anais’ photos given the break down in negotiations.

Upon launch of Cincoro’s website in September 2019, Anais discovered that her photos were being used despite the refusal to pay the licensing fees. Anais subsequently filed a lawsuit against TYCL and Cincoro for injunctive relief and damages.

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Copyright

SCOTUS Edition: No One Can Own the Law - States Cannot Copyright Annotated laws

The Supreme Court of the United States has held in a split 5-4 decision in Georgia v Public.Resource.Org that government authorities cannot copyright annotations that summarize, but are not part of, a state’s body of enforceable statues due to the “government edicts doctrine,” a long recognized doctrine preventing the copyright protection of judicial opinions and statutes.

In Georgia v Public.Resource.Org, the State of Georgia hired Matthew Bender &Co., a division of the LexisNexis Group, under a work-for-hire agreement to draft annotations for the State’s official code, the “Official Code of Georgia Annotated” (OCGA). The agreement also contained a provision that granted all copyrights stemming from the work in the State of Georgia. Public.Resource.Org (PRO), a nonprofit dedicated to facilitating public access to government records and legal materials, posted the OCGA online and distributed copies to various organizations and Georgia officials. Georgia, in turn, sent several cease and desist letters before ultimately suing PRO for infringing on its copyright in the OCGA’s annotations.

PRO counterclaimed by seeking a declaratory judgment that the entire OCGA, including the annotations, fell in the public domain. The District Court sided with the Commission, holding that the annotations were eligible for copyright protection because they had not been enacted into law. The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the District Court's opinion due to the government edicts doctrine. This week, SCOTUS confirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and affirmed that the government edicts doctrine applies to annotations as well.

Specifically, the main principle behind the government edicts doctrine is that no one can own the law. In terms of copyright, this doctrine dictates that judges or other legislative parties cannot be “authors” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. In Georgia’s case, because the Georgia’s state Commission retained a private company to prepare annotations, “[t]he Copyright Act . . . deems the Commission the sole ‘author’ of the work.” Thus, because the Commission “functions as an arm of [the Georgia Legislature],” the Commission is “wield[ing] the legislature’s authority when it works with Lexis to produce the annotations.” Or in other words, the State of Georgia is the author of the annotations and therefore cannot copyright the work as they cannot own it.

The dissent, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by Justice Samuel Alito and in large part by Justice Stephen Breyer) and by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (joined by Breyer) would have permitted Georgia to copyright these materials and retain the exclusive right to authorize their sale. Specifically, the dissenting opinion points to the fact that annotations are not law itself, which mean that the annotations do not represent the will of the people and does not impede “fair notice of the laws.” Additionally, not allowing works such as annotations to be copyrighted, disincentives States and other legislative parties from hiring companies to produce such works as their production cannot be copyrighted and thus cannot be used to produce profits.

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Patent

Artificial Intelligence Are Just Machines, Not Inventors

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The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) ruled on Monday that artificial intelligence (AI) machines cannot be listed as inventors on patent applications as they are not natural persons ( i.e., humans) as required under U.S. Patent Law. The decision came in response to two patents application filed on behalf of an AI System called Device for Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience (DABUS).

DABUS, which was created by Missouri physicist Stephen Thaler, is in simple terms is a creativity machine that consists of artificial neural networks designed to identify potential ideas and/or solutions to problems that are sufficiently novel in nature when compared to the machine's pre-existing knowledge base. DABUS can generate these ideas without human intervention. These ideas eventually lead to the two patents applications that were at issue at in this case, an application for a new food container and the other for a new flashlight. DABUS was listed as the inventor on the applications, while Thaler was listed as the patent holder.

These applications were submitted last year by the Artificial Inventor Project’s team of international patent attorneys, led by Ryan Abbott. Abbott filed these applications not only with the USPTO, but with the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) as well. The Artificial Inventor Project argues that listing an AI as the inventor “might be necessary when hundreds or even thousands of employees have contributed code to a system, like IBM’s Watson supercomputer, before the computer itself then goes on to solve a problem. If no human was involved closely enough with an invention to claim credit for it, then the group fears it may be impossible to patent it at all,” according to The Verge.

The IPO and EPO have already ruled, however, that DABUS cannot be listed as an inventor based on the legal interpretations of who can be considered an “inventor” under their respective jurisdictions’ patent laws.

The USPTO has similarly stated that Federal Code of Regulations refers to an inventor as a "person" and the Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure uses terms that indicate the "conception" of an invention must be performed by a person, and not an AI inventor. The USPTO went on further to state that the various policy issues Thaler raised concerning bigger picture questions of AI inventors do not overcome the "plain language" of the patent laws passed by Congress.


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Nikola vs Tesla $2 Billion Lawsuit Continues

The USPTO has declined Tesla’s inter partes request to invalidate Nikola’s patent 10,077,084 (‘084), an effort Tesla employed to quickly end a $2 billion patent infringement lawsuit against it.

Nikola, a Phoenix Arizona startup truck company that uses hydrogen fuel cells and batteries to power its vehicles, had filed a lawsuit against Tesla Motors in May 2018 claiming that the Tesla Semi, which had debuted in November 2017, was too similar to Nikola’s One Truck that had debuted in December 2016 and infringed upon multiple design patents, such as the "wrap windshield, mid-entry door, fuselage, fender, side cladding, and the overall design of a semi." Nikola had obtained patents on these design elements from the USPTO between February and April 2018.

In September 2019, Tesla asked the USPTO to review Nikola's mid-entry side door patent, seeking to overturn it. The USPTO, however, has declined Tesla's review request stating "that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the '084 patent is unpatentable." The "084" applies to patent 10,077,084, for "Systems, Methods, and Devices for an Automobile Door or Window."

Telsa has also asked the court for a change in venue from Nikola's Arizona base to Tesla's Northern California base and to dismiss the case. The court has agreed to move the venue but has not dismissed the case.

A Nikola Motor spokesperson told ArsTechina, "The lawsuit speaks for itself. We are simply protecting our intellectual property." A Tesla spokesperson told ArsTechina, "It's patently obvious there is no merit to this lawsuit."

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